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Abstract: Do aesthetic reasons have normative authority over us? Could there be
anything like an aesthetic ‘ought’ or an aesthetic obligation? I argue that there are
no aesthetic obligations. We have reasons to act certain ways regarding various
aesthetic objects – most notably, reasons to attend to and appreciate those
objects. But, I argue, these reasons never amount to duties. This is because
aesthetic reasons are merely evaluative, not deontic. They can only entice us or
invite us – they can never compel us. Beauty gives us goods without shoulds.
Some evaluative realms have strong normative force. There are moral obli-
gations; morality issues demands that we ought to follow, and it is wrong to
do otherwise. Perhaps there are epistemic obligations, too.1 What about
beauty? Are there aesthetic obligations? This is the core question I’ll address.
In particular, the core question is whether aesthetic reasons are normatively
strong – whether these reasons compel us and make demands of us.
The core question is related to practical decisions we make about how
seriously we should take beauty in our everyday lives. Is it okay to just sit
at home instead of going to that jazz show tonight? Is it okay to listen to
Nickelback? But it also presents a deep question about the nature of
normativity: Is there a constitutive relationship between evaluation and
obligation? Or can a realm like aesthetics be evaluative without involving
obligation?
The idea that there are aesthetic obligations has some intuitive support.
Our aesthetic language invokes normatively strong reasons. John Broome
says: ‘I once advised a guest that he ought to eat a mangosteen because man-
gosteens are delicious. I was speaking correctly. “Ought” is certainly not
particularly a moral word.’ (Broome 2013, p. 8). I’ve been told that I ought
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly •• (2021) ••–•• DOI: 10.1111/papq.12346
© 2021 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
1
to use Punt e Mes vermouth when I make an Americano. I’ve been told that
I should not listen to Nickelback. And besides the linguistic evidence, there
are intuitive aesthetic oughts. If a lunar eclipse is happening, your children
shouldwatch the eclipse instead of playing around on their phones.2 Further-
more, in the recent discussion of aesthetic obligations, nearly all discussants
accept that there are aesthetic obligations, either giving arguments for them
or accounts of them (Archer andWare 2017, 2018; Cross 2017b; Eaton 2008;
Kubala 2018; Lopes 2018; McGonigal 2018; Sharpe 2000).
I’ll argue to the contrary that aesthetic reasons are never normatively
strong. Here’s a slogan: Beauty gives us goods without shoulds. (The slogan
is slightly misleading for reasons I’ll explore later, but it’ll do for now.)
Beauty may seem to issue demands, but they vanish under a closer look.
My goal here is twofold. First, I argue against several strategies for establish-
ing aesthetic obligations. Second, I present and motivate a metanormative
structure of aesthetic reasons according to which aesthetic reasons never
compel.
I begin by considering what aesthetic obligations would look like if they
existed; I’ll give an account of obligations in terms of normative strength.
Aesthetic reasons become obligations when those reasons are deontic –
when they make demands that it would be wrong to ignore. In §2, I consider
some accounts of aesthetic obligations, and raise worries about these
accounts. I show that the strongest case for aesthetic obligations rests on a
common view about the normative structure of reasons in general: all rea-
sons, including aesthetic reasons, are deontic. In §3, I sketch an alternative
view from Jonathan Dancy that some reasons do not demand. According
to this view, some reasons are not deontic, but merely enticing. In §4, I apply
this view to the aesthetic realm: Aesthetic reasons are enticing. I argue that
this view explains the freedom we have in the aesthetic realm. In §5, I con-
sider some objections.
1. Characterizing aesthetic obligations
What are obligations in general? I’ll work with an account of obligations
that falls in line with previous discussions of aesthetic obligations. It is com-
mon to think of obligations in kinetic metaphors, as reasons that have ‘force’
or ‘binding weight’. In a discussion of the duties of love, R. Jay Wallace
comments that there is a ‘peremptory or decisive aspect that distinguishes
obligations from other kinds of normative consideration’ (2013, p. 192). In
his account of aesthetic obligations, Robbie Kubala draws on Wallace,
claiming that obligatory reasons involve a ‘demand’ or ‘requirement’
(Kubala 2018, p. 271). Marcia Muelder Eaton agrees that obligations are
‘demands’ (Eaton 2008, p. 1). I will assume here that obligations in general
are reasons that issue requirements.3 The crucial issue, then, is whether
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aesthetic reasons ever amount to demands; whether they are what I will call
deontic. Deontic reasons are reasons that make demands; a demand is a con-
sideration that it would be wrong to ignore in the face of further reasons to
the contrary.
Again, the terminology can get messy. Perhaps not all oughts rise to the
level of obligations. We will return to this issue later. For now, the point is
just that many oughts do issue demands. This suggests that aesthetic reasons
have some heft to them in the kinetic sense that indicates obligation.
If obligations in general are demanding reasons, then aesthetic obligations
derive from aesthetic reasons that make demands. So what are aesthetic rea-
sons? A definition would be too much here, but we can work with two con-
ditions. First, aesthetic reasons centrally involve aesthetic properties.
Aesthetic reasons need not reduce to aesthetic properties.4 But aesthetic
properties must figure in some robust way – some way in which the aesthetic
is central. Some reasons are related to aesthetics, but not centrally so. They
derive their force from morality or politics. In older argument for aesthetic
obligations, Howard Press argued that there is at least one aesthetic obliga-
tion: ‘One ought to appreciate what is beautiful’ (Press 1969, p. 525). Press’s
argument relies upon the moral salience of aesthetic appreciation: ‘in the
appreciation of beauty, … we exercise a power, a moral power, and … the
exercise of this power involves moral achievement’ (525). If aesthetic appre-
ciation is an essential part of moral development, it is easy to show that there
are aesthetic obligations. But this is separate from my question – which I
take to be the crucial question of aesthetic obligations – of whether aesthetic
reasons have deontic force on their own. So I will restrict myself to aesthetic
reasons which centrally involve aesthetic properties.
Second, and perhaps more controversially: aesthetic reasons centrally
involve certain mental attitudes such as attention and/or appreciation: aes-
thetic obligations are cases where aesthetic reasons provide a binding reason
to appreciate or attend to something. Why take appreciation and attention
to be central to aesthetic reasons? The question is all themore salient because
there is exciting recent work that underscores the importance of aesthetic ac-
tion. As Cross (2017a), King (2018), and Lopes (2018) point out, aesthetic
reasons do not just involve reasons to appreciate; they also involve reasons
for actions: hanging drywall, selecting a Honeycrisp apple rather than a
Gala, paying the bus fare to get to the theater. While aesthetic action is
important, I maintain here that appreciation and attention are central to
aesthetic reasons. For one thing, attention and appreciation have been
paradigmatic in several important accounts of aesthetic obligations
(Kubala 2018; McGonigal 2018). For another thing, while aesthetic
action-involving reasons are indeed crucial and underexplored, the force of
those reasons seems to derive from the centrality of appreciation to the aes-
thetic realm. No doubt our aesthetic lives are broader than mere apprecia-
tion. Yet, as Keren Gorodeisky (Forthcoming) argues, these actions seem
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to rest upon the centrality of appreciation. You select the Honeycrisp apple
over the Gala because it will lead to a tastier galette – tastiness is a value that
centrally involves appreciation. Your reason for driving to the theater, if it is
aesthetic, derives from the value of the movie you are going to see, which is
centrally related to its worthiness for attention.5
Aesthetic obligations, then, are deontic aesthetic reasons – aesthetic rea-
sons with demanding force – where ‘aesthetic reasons’ centrally involve
aesthetic properties and an attitude of appreciation.
2. Three strategies
With an intuitive understanding of aesthetic obligations in place, let’s con-
sider three prominent strategies for establishing aesthetic obligations.6
2.1. THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT STRATEGY
The first strategy is an appeal to intuition. Some philosophers present intu-
itive cases – thought experiments which are meant to show decisively that
there are aesthetic obligations. Call this the Thought Experiment Strategy.
Marcia Muelder Eaton presents burning museum cases. Suppose that you
can save only one of two paintings from a burning building, ‘paintings that
you believe are equal in moral value’. Suppose one of these paintings is more
beautiful than the other. Eaton writes: ‘I believe that you have an uncontro-
versial, nonconditional aesthetic obligation to save one rather than the
other, namely, the more beautiful painting’ (Eaton 2008, p. 5). Andrew
McGonigal presents drowning art cases – cases where you can easily prevent
the destruction of a beautiful artwork if it costs very little (say, getting your
clothes wet). In such cases, McGonigal claims, you clearly ought to save the
artwork.
Both thought experiments appeal to relatively objective or quasi-realist
aesthetic properties. The way they are presented, the obligations are not
rooted in any personal relation or attachment one bears to the object, nor
are they rooted in unique sensibilities. The obligations are rooted in the
objective aesthetic value of the paintings.
But this raises doubts about how truly aesthetic the obligations are. Per-
haps we are smuggling in historical properties to pass as aesthetic value in
the thought experiments. Consider the drowning art case. The intuition that
we ought to save the more beautiful painting may be rooted in the thought
that we ought to save the paintingwithmore art-historical or cultural impor-
tance. For the intuition does not seem to change in an aesthetic Twin Earth
scenario when we suppose that the painting has no aesthetic value. Suppose,
for example, that the painting in danger is regarded by nearly everyone as
very beautiful. In fact, only you know that the painting has no aesthetic
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value. Yet it still seems clear that you ought to save the painting, just because
it is held in very high regard by nearly everybody. This suggests that you
ought to save paintings that more people enjoy, or paintings that have
art-historical importance. If true, this suggests that art-historical importance
– not objective aesthetic value – creates a duty to save these painting.
Even if you find the Thought Experiment Strategy compelling, two prob-
lems are looming. First: At best these cases provide a question rather than an
answer. Suppose these cases establish that there are aesthetic obligations. If
there are aesthetic obligations, what is their normative structure? The obliga-
tions are presumably underwritten by the beauty of the objects in question.
How could beauty give rise to such obligations? This is the core question
about aesthetic obligation. The Thought Experiment Strategy does not offer
an answer.
Second: these intuitive cases do not involve appreciation or attention, the
paradigmatic act of aesthetic obligation. For the Thought Experiment Strat-
egy to be convincing, we need a story about how our obligations to save
these artworks are rooted in obligations to attend to or appreciate these
works. But no one has offered such an explanation. And none seems forth-
coming, either – just because you save them, does it mean people ought to
look at them? Absent such a story, these actions do not seem like they will
establish aesthetic obligations in the sense that matters for the core question.
2.2. THE RELATIONAL STRATEGY
The second strategy is both reductive and relational: Aesthetic obligations
are instances of more general obligations brought about by relations, either
to oneself or to something else. This strategy is developed along different
lines by Anthony Cross, Robbie Kubala, and AndrewMcGonigal. Call this
the Relational Strategy.
On Cross’s account, aesthetic obligations exist as instances of duties of
love.7 Cross describes duties of love as follows: they are ‘obligations to some
individual that one incurs in virtue of standing in a particular relationship to
that individual – namely, a loving relationship’ (McGonigal 2017, p. 96). Be-
cause we love artworks, we incur obligations that result from relationships of
love. We owe it to ourselves to appreciate some artworks. Cross’s picture
consists of two stages. At a first stage, we develop relationships with art-
works, just like we develop relationships with people. Certain movies, paint-
ings, or albums become important to our practical identities. At a second
stage, we make commitments to these objects in virtue of the value they have
for our own practical identities. Think of the punk, the metalhead, the opera
lover, the hophead, the foodie. These types of fans have practical commit-
ments to distinct kinds of beauty. Those commitments provide deontic rea-
sons for attention and appreciation of art. Cross notes, crucially, that
commitments to art must be merited by qualities in the artworks, just as
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commitments to friends must bemerited by qualities of friends. There are no
obligations to love bad art.
On Kubala’s account, aesthetic obligation is based not in commitment,
but in promising: it is ‘a species of promissory obligation, namely self-
promising’ (Kubala 2018, p. 271). Kubala invokes a passage from Proust,
in which Marcel promises to return to admire the hawthorns. According
to Kubala’s account, Marcel promises to become the kind of person who at-
tends to hawthorns, and therefore creates an obligation for himself to attend
to hawthorns.8 Kubala argues that we have obligations to ourselves – obli-
gations borne of self-promises – to attend to things. These self-promises
are rooted in practical identities, especially as fans and aficionados.9 You
should not neglect punk shows if you are a punk; you should not neglect
Springsteen’s Nebraska if you are a Springsteen fan. Kubala’s account is a
self-promise account of aesthetic obligation; the obligation is rooted from
promises we make to ourselves in virtue of our own practical identities.
The promises provide deontic reasons.
McGonigal offers an account based on integrity: We have obligations to
ourselves to honor our own aesthetic preferences. We should pursue aes-
thetic projects that authentically express the kinds of things we like and
the kinds of people we are. If you consider yourself a foodie, you ought to
check out the new food truck on campus instead of going to the crappy caf-
eteria for the fourth time this week.
These three accounts share two main features. First, they are all grounded
in individual or personal relationships, primarily to one’s self. They rely on
similar relations – relationships, self-promising, and integrity – all of which
place obligations squarely in one’s own self-conception, act of commitment,
or practical identity.10 The second main feature is that they all appeal to
practical identities or self-conceptions that are importantly related to deep
personal attachments. On all these views, aesthetic obligations relate to
something like fanhood. Commitment, self-promising, and integrity all de-
pend not just on a high regard for some artwork, object, or practice, but
on one’s incorporating that aesthetic object into their sense of self – their
practical identity.
These features give rise to several problems. First, because these accounts
are all rooted in deep personal attachments, the scope of aesthetic obliga-
tions is now smaller than we might have thought. On these accounts,
aesthetic obligations arise only as relations between fans and the objects,
genres, or works that they are fans of. This does not explain the cases of
aesthetic obligations mentioned at the outset: The thought that my child
should put his phone down and see the sunset, for example. These putative
obligations are not rooted in personal attachments. If you find those cases
in need of an explanation, the Relational Strategy will not help you.
A second objection requires a little more set-up. It begins from a separate,
more familiar objection: Aesthetic reasons are not up to the task of
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providing things worthy of commitment, integrity, or self-promises, because
they can be undone by one’s self. Because we can opt out of them, the com-
mitments are meaningless. Obligations of our practical identities, or obliga-
tions of integrity, have no hold on us when we change our practical
identities. As a metalhead, Jill ought to listen to IronMaiden’s The Number
of the Beast. But if Jill relinquishes her practical identity as a metalhead, it
seems that she no longer has an obligation to listen to any metal – she can
simply release herself from the obligation. Or she can commit to a more par-
ticular identity that gets her off the hook from listening to that album (she
might avow a practical identity as a metalhead who does not listen to Iron
Maiden albums, or to that IronMaiden album) and thereby avoid this obli-
gation. We are left with the question of how aesthetic reasons could evince
authority over ourselves. If we can change our practical identities anyways,
do aesthetic reasons present deontic force at all?
Cross confronts this objection head on (Unpublished MS.). In reply, he
rightly points that one can have obligations even if it is possible to be re-
leased from them. For instance, I have obligations while I’m married. But
I’m released from those obligations if my spouse and I end our marriage.
The fact that I can release myself from obligations does not show that they
do not exist in the first place; it just shows that they can be changed. Not
all commitments are lifelong. Temporary commitments are still commit-
ments. Granting this to the Relational Strategy, though, notice that familiar
commitments from self-promises, relationships, and integrity are usually
codified in some form – marriages and jobs involve formal promises, codi-
fied in vows and contracts. Even commitments to go to lunch are spoken,
texted, agreed upon. But our aesthetic lives aren’t often characterized by
codification. Relationships to artworks rarely involve explicit promises.
Either these relationships do not occur very often (because they are not cod-
ified very often), or they involve an implicit structure that needs to be spelled
out more.
In fact, when we think more about specific cases, it’s not clear that many
fans have personal connections with art that are deep enough to count as
commitment, self-promising, or integrity. Do fans ordinarily make commit-
ments to the objects of their fanhood? Certainly some do; Kubala gives an
excellent example of a devoted opera fan. But many people – andmany fans
– do not make anything like promises to themselves; nor do they develop
relationships of commitment with aesthetic objects; nor does their integrity
lie on the aesthetic objects they appreciate. I’m a fan of several genres. I stay
up with new releases, attend shows, and read reviews. But I would not say
I’ve made a commitment to those genres, or that my integrity rests upon
my appreciation for them, or that I’ve made a promise to myself regarding
my future pursuit of them. As Cheshire Calhoun (2009) points out, commit-
ment (or integrity, or promising) implies a future-directed diachronic atti-
tude regarding one’s future self: in the aesthetic realm, this means a
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commitment to stand firm in one’s appreciation come what may. In the aes-
thetic realm, however, I keep things open; I come back to Kanye West with
fresh ears every once in a while, willing to hear his music in a new way. I’m
open to seeing it in a new light. The central point here – one which I will re-
turn to later – is that our aesthetic loves certainly exist, but they are open to
revision. They can be adapted, revamped, canned, and updated. We have
freedom in our aesthetic pursuits; the Relational Strategy does not reflect
that freedom.
The third problem with these accounts is that they paint an overly narrow
picture of a proper aesthetic life. If there can be commitments that compel us
to attend to and appreciate art, then such commitments can also compel us
not to attend to and appreciate art. I can make a promise to myself not to
listen to punk, or jazz, or rap. But that does not quite feel right.
Imagine that you have Marcel over one night. After a third round of
drinks, you really want to blow his aesthetic mind. You put on Gram
Parson’s 1974 album Greivous Angel. Given Marcel’s practical identity as
an urbane and sensitive aesthete, he has made a self-promise against listen-
ing to that twangy country sound. So, it seems, if commitments are loose
enough to be gained in the way suggested above, thenMarcel has an obliga-
tion not to attend to the country music. But this is absurd. Surely Marcel
should indulge you and give it a listen.
One might object at this point that Marcel also has an obligation to be
kind and obliging to his friends, and to that extent Marcel ought to listen.
The obligation to be kind outweighs the obligation not to listen. But even
if the aesthetic obligation is overridden, notice thatMarcel still has a deontic
reason not to listen. It seems strange that we could evince obligations to not
attend to some artworks. But this is what the view implies.
Fourth, a point of internal consistency: Both Cross and McGonigal ap-
peal to the intuitive cases of burning and drowning art to motivate the view
that aesthetic obligations exist in the first place. But the Relational Strategy
cannot explain the intuitive cases in the Thought Experiment Strategy. In
the intuitive cases, the obligation is rooted in the objective (or at least
quasi-realist) aesthetic value of the artworks. According to the Relational
Strategy, aesthetic obligations rest ultimately in personal orientations or at-
titudes. If the intuitive cases are supposed to motivate the view that there are
aesthetic obligations for the Relational Account, the Relational Account
ought to accommodate them as genuine instances of aesthetic obligations.
But it cannot. To the extent that you find those intuitive cases in need of
an explanation, the Relational Strategy will not help you.
In fact, The Relational Strategy can start to chafe against the intuitive
cases. Let us go back to the burningmuseum case. Suppose I have developed
a strong personal relationship with the less beautiful painting – the painting
in the Bad Art wing rather than in the Post-Impressionism wing. According
to these relational accounts, I ought to save the painting I have a love for,
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not the most beautiful painting. But Eaton thought it was clear that I ought
to save the more beautiful painting.
2.3. THE MONIST STRATEGY
The final account of aesthetic obligations requires a little more care. It has
not been fully articulated as an account of aesthetic obligations, but it is per-
fectly plausible as such. This account takes its inspiration fromDomLopes’s
recent account of aesthetic value, which incorporates normative terms that
suggest a close relationship with deontic reasons.
Aesthetic values, according to Lopes, are essentially practical – they pro-
vide reasons for action.11 And reasons for action are just reasons that lend
weight to what one ought to do. The fact that the new Jim Jarmusch film
is good gives you reason to go see it. Aesthetic values provide reasons for
action by lending weight to the fact that you ought to take some aesthetic
action. You have aesthetic reason to see the new Jarmusch film when you
ought to go see it. Lopes’s account of reasons connects to a ‘should’ claim:
the fact that x is V is an aesthetic reason for A to φ in C = the fact that x is V lends weight to the
proposition that A aesthetically should φ in C. (Lopes 2018, p. 38)
Aesthetic values just are reasons to undertake some action, and reasons
just are things that you should do.
The claim that reasons just are things that you should do is reminiscent of
a common view that reasons are constitutively deontic: What it is for some-
thing to be a reason is just for it to support a normative requirement. (As we
will see, there are reasons to think that Lopes would not take this route. But
Lopes does take this view to be consistent with the view that there are aes-
thetic obligations, and this monist interpretation offers a way to support
such a claim.) According to this view, reasons always issue or contribute
to directives because we always ought to do what we have most reason to
do. It is wrong not to act on one’s reason unless one has a countervailing rea-
son. Let us call this viewmonism about reasons, because it holds that all rea-
sons share the same normative profile: They are deontic in force.12 As
Jonathan Dancy characterizes this view, ‘the term ‘reason’ means (among
other things, perhaps) a consideration which one would be wrong not to
act on in the absence of any opposition’ (Dancy 2004, p. 92).
If reasons in general are deontic, then so are aesthetic reasons. And there-
fore, because we defined an obligation as a deontic reason, it follows trivially
that there are aesthetic obligations. Let us call this argumentative strategy
the Monist Strategy, because the strategy proceeds from a monist account
of the normative force of reasons.
Some philosophers have thought that values reduce to reasons. So if all
reasons are deontic, then values are deontic, too. Christine Tappolet
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describes this view as follows: ‘To be valuable or good would be nothing else
than to have natural properties that make it the case that one ought… to act
or react in certain ways. An imperative would lie at the heart of values.’
(Tappolet 2005, p. 397) This means that all value is deontic; there is no dis-
tinction in kind between the right and the good, only a distinction of weight.
The Monist Strategy is an elegant strategy. It is simple. And it succeeds
where the Relational Strategy fails. For it explains the intuitive cases – cases
that Lopes cites in motivating the view that there are aesthetic obligations.
Monism explains why we ought to save the drowning painting just in virtue
of the thing’s value: The painting’s beauty presents reasons for us to save it.
But I believe theMonist Strategy should not be adopted so quickly. In the
next section, I present an alternate account of reasons.
3. Enticing reasons
According to an alternative model of aesthetic reasons from a familiar
meta-normative position, not all reasons are deontic in force. Some reasons
have a non-deontic normative profile.
Following up on a suggestion from Joseph Raz (1999), Jonathan
Dancy (2004) has argued against the monist view of reasons. Dancy argues
that some reasons do not create oughts or obligations; some reasons make
options appealing, but they do not demand. Dancy calls these reasons ‘entic-
ing reasons’.13 Dancy writes: ‘A set of enticing reasons can be sufficient to
make the action they recommend worth doing, fun, exciting, attractive,
and so on’ (Dancy 2004, p. 99). Enticing reasons never mandate or compel;
it is not wrong to ignore the call of an enticing reason. An enticing reason,
writes Dancy, is ‘a reason that it is not wrong to fail to respond to, in the
absence of opposing considerations’ (Dancy 2004, p. 92).
Here’s an example similar to Dancy’s: Suppose you are thinking about
seeing a play tonight. Let us say it’s Annie Baker’s play The Flick. The Flick
is a great play, and this is a reason to see it. But suppose you just lounge
around at home instead. If so, you have not done wrong, even though you
may be acting silly. This is because a reason to see a play is not a duty; it does
not have deontic force.14 Instead, it is a merely enticing reason.
Not all enticing reasons, Dancy claims, are enough to make their options
worthwhile. Just because an option has an enticing reason in its favor does
not mean it is worthwhile. To be worthwhile, enticing reasons must be suffi-
cient. And multiple enticing reasons can be sufficient. Dancy writes that ‘An
enticing reason (or a set of enticing reasons) is sufficient if it makes its option
worth doing. There may be more than one thing that is worth doing, as
things stand’ (Dancy 2004, p. 95).15
If enticing reasons do not have any deontic force, what grounds them as
reasons? Why do not they make demands? One way of thinking about
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enticing reasons says that they are not binding because they are grounded in
subjective, non-universal preferences. On this view, a reason has deontic
force only when it has universal applicability – and because aesthetic reasons
lack universal applicability, they do not have deontic force. (McGonigal
2018 suggests this line of argument regarding aesthetic obligations.) Dancy
considers this account of enticing reasons. But he argues against it:Many de-
ontic reasons lack universal applicability (e.g. obligations to particular loved
ones). So the categorical/personal distinction is not a useful way tomark the
boundary between deontic and enticing reasons. Instead, Dancy suggests,
enticing reasons are distinctive in virtue of their functions – they have a
unique style of outputs. Whereas deontic reasons take us to oughts, enticing
reasons take us to bests. On this account, enticing reasons are evaluative
without being deontic in virtue of their unique teleology. Wemight compare
this to the debate about requiring, justifying, and favoring force of reasons
(Horgan and Timmons 2010, Portmore 2011, and Archer 2016). Reasons
can favor certain acts of appreciation, and they can justify those acts of
appreciation; but they can do so without requiring us to appreciate things.
One might worry that enticing reasons come apart from evaluation; we
might be enticed by aesthetically bad objects. However, this is to misunder-
stand enticing reasons. Enticing reasons are not subjective properties having
to do with desire. They are rooted in the objective evaluative properties of
objects.
Margaret Little (2013) bolsters the case for enticing reasons. She says: We
often think of the justificatory force of reasons as being deontic. Think, for
example, of reasons to act morally or reasons to believe something. But,
Little argues, justificatory reasons do not have this weight in other realms.
She provides two examples of justificatory reasons that are not deontic: (1)
Fittingness in emotions. Emotions are often warranted – think of anger –
but we do not always think that one ought to have that emotion. Sometimes,
emotions are justified but not required. You are permitted to get angry at the
person who cuts in front of you in line, but there’s no sense in which you
ought to get angry at them. (2) Doing something sweet for one’s partner.
Sweet actions for a loved one are nice to do, and they are justified. But
one is not wrong for not doing them – otherwise one would be required to
do something sweet for one’s partner at every moment! Little argues that
we ought not to confuse a reason’s justificatory force with its deontic force,
because the two come apart.16
R. JayWallace argues for enticing reasons with slightly different terminol-
ogy. Wallace distinguishes deontic reasons (claims about what an agent
ought to do) from aspirational reasons (claims about what it would be best
do to). Wallace distinguishes three cases. In one case, MOVIE, you have a
choice between going to see an Antonioni film or staying home and
watching some trash TV. The reason does not have deontic force; it would
be good to see the Antonioni film, but you do not have to. In another case,
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SMALL LOAN, you have a choice between paying your credit card bill or not.
Here, you have a deontic reason, but it is purely practical; it seems that you
ought, practically, to pay the loan. In another case, DISTRAUGHT FRIEND, it
seems you ought to comfort a distraught friend rather than attend an unim-
portant meeting. Here, you have a deontic reason in a moral sense. You
ought, morally, to comfort your friend. According to Wallace, this shows
something important about the structure of normativity in general. Wallace
considers what he calls a teleological approach to normativity, according to
which ‘the fundamental normative relation is the productive relation that
our potential actions stand in to valuable states of affairs’ (Wallace 2013,
p. 160). The teleological approach to normativity says that one ought to pro-
mote value. If this is true, there is no room for the purely aspirational
normativity in MOVIE. So,Wallace concludes, the teleological approachmust
be wrong. Notice that the argument here will apply against monism.
Wallace gives an alternative picture of obligation, according to which de-
ontic demands are necessarily second-personal.17 To make a moral demand
is tomake a demand of someone. Aesthetic reasons are precisely not second-
personal.
Unlike, say, an aesthetic response, … moral blame makes a demand; it addresses the charge of
having acted culpably, that is, having done wrong, violated an all-things-considered moral obli-
gation, without adequate excuse. It holds someone answerable in a way that third-personal re-
sponses like aesthetic attitudes do not. (Wallace 2013, p. 220).
The main lesson is that the monist account of reasons is not the only game
in town. And, because the most prominent strategy for aesthetic obligations
rests upon this account, we should at least be hesitant about accepting the
Monist Strategy. This also puts us in a position to see why aesthetic reasons
just cannot be deontic.
4. Aesthetic reasons are merely enticing reasons
Suppose we give up the monist picture and accept that there are enticing rea-
sons. My claim here is that all aesthetic reasons are merely enticing reasons.
It’s clear that some aesthetic reasons are enticing. Both Dancy and
Wallace offer aesthetic reasons as paradigmatic instances of enticing rea-
sons. But why think that all aesthetic reasons are enticing? I cannot offer a
complete defense, but I’ll offer one consideration. The view that all aesthetic
reasons are enticing explains one striking fact thatmany have found compel-
ling about the aesthetic realm: Aesthetics is a realm of freedom. The way I
am thinking of it here, ‘freedom’ has to do with negative freedom; it is free-
dom from anything.18
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Many thinkers have emphasized the importance of play in aesthetic life.
Famously, Kant (1793) emphasizes aesthetic experience as essentially in-
volving a free play of the faculties. Schiller says that play lies the heart of
beauty: ‘With beauty shall man only play, and it is with beauty only that he
shall play’ (Schiller 15.8, p. 107). Something soundswrong about a life where
our aesthetic choices are required rather than free. Play – in Schiller’s sense –
involves the ability to experiment. When you play, you are not forced to
choose the best option. If aesthetic reasons were deontic, we would be com-
pelled to always choose the best option.
Hilde Hein distinguishes several elements in Schiller’s aesthetic account of
play. I want to focus on her point that aesthetic play is free from compulsion.
Play consists in the functioning of the faculties in the fashion to which they are normally
adapted, cognitive as well as physical, but without the compulsion of either internal pressures
or external demands. (Hein 1968, p. 67)
A beautiful painting or album strikes us in a way that may seem like we
need to listen to it – but there is no pressure that we ought to do so. When
Schiller says that ‘With beauty shall man only play,’ he is suggesting that
the most we can do with beauty is play with it.
Of course, some play is competitive. Competitive play is demanding; it in-
volves pressure. In a good game of poker or hockey, you need to maximize
chips or goals. But competitive play is not Schillerian play. Schillerian play is
open-ended. Think of a child playing with a toy truck; this play does not in-
volve any pressure to maximize. If we had a duty to aesthetically maximize,
we would not be able to explore in natural and spontaneous ways. But this
exploration is what makes aesthetic activities so fun – and so important.
This is kind of play that the great film critic Pauline Kael had in mind
when, in her famous essay ‘Trash, Art, and the Movies,’ she argued that
the great virtue of trash movies was that they do not demand anything from
us – they do not involve duty. Part of Kael’s point is that much of what
passes for received high art exerts pressure on us to have a certain response;
this pressure itself, Kael says, robs us of the freedom necessary for aesthetic
life.
Perhaps the single most intense pleasure ofmoviegoing is this non-aesthetic one of escaping from
the responsibilities of having the proper responses required of us…And yet this is probably the
best and most common basis for developing an aesthetic sense because responsibility to pay at-
tention and to appreciate is anti-art, it makes us too anxious for pleasure, too bored for response.
Far from supervision and official culture, in the darkness at themovies where nothing is asked of
us and we are left alone, the liberation from duty and constraint allows us to develop our own
aesthetic responses. (p. 104)
Kael claims that ‘liberation from duty and constraint’ is necessary for aes-
thetic responses themselves. But her comments suggest further that freedom
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is necessary for aesthetic education. Of course, part of Kael’s point here is
that developing our own aesthetic response requires freedom from other
voices. This is a point about autonomism –we need to cultivate our own ap-
preciations from an essentially first-person point of view. But it is also a
claim about the structure of aesthetic appreciation: appreciation in general
must be free from duty and constraint.
Someone who endorses the monist account of reasons may try to show
that aesthetic reasons allow for freedom even if they are deontic. For ex-
ample, Jerrold Levinson argues that we are free to choose between aes-
thetic options to the extent that these options on an evaluative par with
each other (2010, p. 231). You have freedom to choose between (for
example) music by Kendrick Lamar, stories by Alice Munro, or movies
by Abbas Kiarostami. Works by these artists are, let us suppose, the best
in their genres. And because they are all on a par, you are free to choose
between them. However, it’s not clear that this is real freedom. It’s not the
kind of freedom which will allow for flourishing aesthetic lives. Under this
monist view, the pressure is still on for us to perform at our aesthetic best.
My claim instead is that it’s permissible for you to knowingly choose what
you know is not the best. To demand otherwise is to allow an element of
compulsion in our aesthetic lives. As Margaret Little (2013) points out,
being a free agent seems to require the ability to act freely even in the face
of conclusive or optimizing reasons. This is the freedom that aesthetic rea-
sons offer. And it’s different from moral freedom. (Even Jonathan
Dancy (2004, p. 99) points out the freedom of enticing reasons: ‘one is,
as it were, in charge of one’s enticing reasons. It is never irrational or
wrong to choose an enticing action other than the one that is most entic-
ing – even though it can be pretty silly to do so, and, in this weak sense,
contrary to reason.’)
Finally, consider a person who Alex King calls the indifferent anaesthetic:
someone who recognizes what’s beautiful but does not feel a pull to pursue
it. Intuitively, there’s nothing truly wrong with such a person (King 2018).
If aesthetic reasons only entice and do not demand, there’s nothing incoher-
ent with both recognizing an aesthetic reason and not feeling compelled to
act upon it. King’s point is that motivational internalism seems particularly
implausible in the aesthetic realm. To my mind, this point helps to explain
the freedom of the aesthetic realm. And, in turn, it helps to explain why
beauty offers goods without shoulds.
My argument here is consonant with other claims that there are no aes-
thetic obligations. Consider what Martha Nussbaum says:
I can, visiting a museum, survey many fine objects with appropriate awe and tenderness. I can
devote myself now to one, now to another without the sense that the objects make conflicting
claims against my love and care. If one day I spend my entire museum visit gazing at Turners,
I have not incurred a guilt against the Blakes in the next room. (1990, p. 132)
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My claim that aesthetic reasons are enticing reasons explains Nussbaum’s
language here, that art has power over us without our incurring an obliga-
tion to it.19
5. Objections
The first objection is that the monist can accommodate freedom in a dif-
ferent way. One might hold that there are different degrees of deontic
force: Aesthetic reasons may carry deontic force, but it is not serious
enough to challenge our freedom. Lopes himself takes this kind of
line: ‘Morality has no lock on normativity, and not all normativity is
heavy-duty normativity.’ (Lopes 2018, p. 40) According to Lopes, aes-
thetic reasons can have deontic force, but without being serious. ‘We
wonder what we should do, even when there is no dilemma in sight, noth-
ing serious at stake, and no impending guilt or shame.’ (Lopes 2018,
p. 40). Likewise, John Broome argues against Dancy’s picture of enticing
reasons (Broome 2013, pp. 60–61). Broome claims that you should do
what your reasons say, even when it comes to aesthetic matters like eating
mangosteens. But, Broome says, these shoulds are not obligations. Ac-
cording to this response, aesthetic reasons are deontic to some extent,
but they are not serious enough to count as heavy-duty shoulds. We still
have freedom.
In response, I’m happy to allow that some shoulds are not deontic.
But that just makes them ‘shoulds’ of enticing reasons. Recall that, for
Dancy, enticing reasons may be conclusive reasons. Perhaps enticing
shoulds are just conclusive shoulds. But it does not follow that one really
ought to comply with these reasons, or that it is wrong not to. Indeed,
taking this line allows me to explain the cases of ‘oughts’ and ‘shoulds’
at the beginning of the paper. While there may seem to be aesthetic
shoulds, they are not normatively strong enough to rise to the level of
obligations.
But this raises a larger issue about what Wallace calls the teleological
approach to normativity – the view that all reasons contribute to
directives.20 It raises the issue of whether evaluation and normativity are
essentially bound up together. A full analysis of the teleological approach
may be beyond this essay. But I hope to have at least presented and moti-
vated a competing approach according to which there are non-teleological
reasons.
A second objection is that there are clear obligations in some realms of art.
For example, it seems clear that performers ought to play the notes of
the score. On one account, they owe this to the composer (Sharpe 2000,
p. 323). I deny that these are genuine obligations. Elsewhere, I argued that
these obligations are less serious than they seem; throughout western
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fine-art music, performers have frequently disregarded notes of the score
(Dyck 2014). However, there is still a problem that such a norm exists in
many circles; how do we deal with those instances? This norm pertains to
performance. It does not center on appreciation, which is the case I focus
on here.21
Relatedly, onemay point out that certain genres or categories have consti-
tutive normative rules about what it means to be good in a genre. Consider,
for example, Chekhov’s dictum: if there is a loaded gun introduced at the
beginning of a story, the gun ought to go off before the end of the story.
In reply, notice that this objection implies a form of artistic generalism, the
view that there are general principles of artistic value. A full discussion of
generalism and particularism is beyond the scope of this essay. But there
are many reasons to be skeptical about aesthetic or artistic generalism, not
least of which is that satisfactory general rules of artistic or aesthetic value
have yet to be articulated. It’s easy to imagine a good play in which a loaded
gun, introduced in the first act, plays an important role in creating tension
but never goes off.
Another objection comes from the following case: Imagine someone who
does not care about aesthetic value. They do not seek out beauty; they do not
appreciate beauty when it comes around. It is not that this person is hostile
to aesthetics, or that they are a crank.We can imagine that they live a happy
life, surrounded by good friends, and doing a great amount of good. They
are a scrooge, but an exclusively aesthetic scrooge. There seems to be some-
thing intuitively wrong with Aesthetic Scrooge: They do not live up to the
demand that they ought to undertake some aesthetic exploits. This suggests
that everyone ought to appreciate some aesthetic value in their lives. But this
is an aesthetic obligation. So there is an aesthetic obligation to appreciate
some things, at least sometimes.
I am unconvinced that there is anything wrong with Aesthetic Scrooge – I
appealed to King earlier in defense of such a person. But it’s not a problem
formy view if Aesthetic Scrooge seems bad to you.While this might be some
kind of aesthetic obligation, it is not the kind of obligation that is the subject
of this paper. This example shows only that we should make room in our
lives for the aesthetic domain. It does not tell us how to fill that domain.
The question of whether we ought to fill our aesthetic domains some partic-
ular way or other, I take it, is the central question about aesthetic obligation
– at least, it is the question that has occupied the literature on aesthetic obli-
gations. That is different from the question of whether we ought to fill our
aesthetic domains at all. As such, there may be imperfect duties in aesthetics:
duties to take up aesthetic ends. But there are no perfect duties – duties to
perform specific actions.22
The final objection comes from cases where we weigh moral reasons
against aesthetic reasons. Consider a debate between installing more lights
in a highway – for safety – or no lights – for beauty.23 Here we have a
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debate between moral reasons and aesthetic reasons. People may choose
not to install the lights because of aesthetic value. Yet, if aesthetic reasons
are merely enticing, how could they ever stand up to moral reasons? If I
am right, then moral reasons and aesthetic reasons are not of a piece.
And if they are not of a piece, then they cannot be compared against each
other. Yet they are compared against each other. So (the objection goes) I
am wrong.
In response, I allow that enticing reasons are often compared against
deontic reasons. And I allow that enticing reasons often win out. Tonight,
I’m going to spend my money at the movies rather than at Oxfam. We
can still compare these reasons against each other even though they are
two different realms of reasons, with different normative profiles.
6. Conclusion
What are we to say about the apparent aesthetic obligations we started with?
Theymay have some intuitive pull still. Instead of aesthetic obligations, they
may carry some social force or some developmental force.
This discussion has assumed that aesthetic properties and reasons can be
carved out from other kinds of properties and reasons. If one thinks that
the aesthetic is essentially bound up with the moral or political, the whole
issue quickly loses steam. I have not argued here for the autonomy of the
aesthetic realm; I have taken that for granted, because it seems to be
assumed by the core question. My argument, then, shows that there are no
purely aesthetic obligations.
The claim, then, is not that we are free to do what we like in any aesthetic
matter whatever. For the aesthetic domain frequently overlaps with the
moral and social domains. The claim here is only that the aesthetic realm
is distinct in kind from the moral and the social. Many aesthetic questions
overlap with heavy weight of culture, in which aesthetic, social, and political
values arise with pressing urgency. In practice, aesthetic values swirl around
with social and moral values and obligations: Obligations to do right by
each other in how we treat one another’s art and bodies and minds. But
to say that these obligations are aesthetic sells short their important
second-personal nature.
Of course, one may reject the autonomist assumption. One may say that
the aesthetic domain is not separate from social and moral realms. I often
find this view tempting myself. On this view, the question’s answer becomes
obvious: Of course there are aesthetic obligations, because our obligations to
each other bleed into the aesthetic realm.24
My thesis has consequences for how we carve up evaluation and
normativity. It suggests that the normative contours of the aesthetic domain
THERE ARE NO PURELY AESTHETIC OBLIGATIONS 17
© 2021 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
may not map neatly onto a meta-ethical framework. As we try to carve up
reasons, normativity, and evaluation, we need to pay attention to the unique




1 See, for example, Feldman (1988), Papineau (2013), Weatherson (2008).
2 Thanks to Thi Nguyen for this example.
3 Cross qualifies the source but not the nature of aesthetic obligations, claiming only that
aesthetic obligations derive from rights; ‘works of art are the bearers ofmoral rights which gen-
erate corresponding obligations… on the part of individuals who interact with those artworks’
(Cross 2017b, p. 89).
4 Here I follow Andrew McGonigal’s (2018) liberal account of aesthetic properties.
5 If you are not convinced that aesthetic reasons for appreciation and attention are central,
then you can just qualify my conclusion: There are no obligations of aesthetic appreciation.
That’s still a significant claim.
6 There are other strategies. For instance, Archer andWare (2017) argue that there is a dis-
tinctively aesthetic form of blame that targets responsibility. Thanks to an anonymous referee
for drawing this to my attention.
7 Cross discusses obligations to artworks, not to aesthetic objects. In a later paper, how-
ever, he clarifies that the view can be extended to aesthetic objects in general (Cross Unpub-
lished MS.).
8 ‘On the morning of our departure … my mother … found me standing in tears on the
steep little path close to Tansonville, bidding farewell to my hawthorns, clasping their sharp
branches in my arms.… ‘Oh, my poor little hawthorns’, I was assuring them through my sobs,
‘it is not youwhowant tomakeme unhappy, to forceme to leave you.You, you have never done
me any harm. So I shall always love you’. And, drying my eyes, I promised them … I would
never copy the foolish example of other men, but that even in Paris, on fine spring days, instead
of paying calls and listening to silly talk, I would set off for the country to see the first
hawthorn-trees in bloom.’ (Proust 1992, pp. 203–204.)
9 Kubala’s account takes inspiration from Richard Moran’s (2012) claim that beauty, in
some sense, stakes a claim on us – a claim that is binding without being universal.
10 Cross’s account requires that the object have some merit in the first place. But this
meriting property does not ground the obligation itself; it is only necessary for the obligation.
11 Some may see this claim as at odds with my claim that appreciation is central to the aes-
thetic realm. I’m not so sure; it’s plausible that appreciation might be a kind of mental action.
Anyway, I do not think that anything hangs on this characterization of the aesthetic here.
12 How exactly the normative demand gets spelled out need not concern us here. Perhaps
every reason has its own pro tanto obligation. Or perhaps obligations pertain to all-things-
considered reasons, or to overriding reasons. As Lopes acknowledges, aesthetic reasons may
not always be decisive (Lopes 2018, p. 39).
13 Dancy repurposes the notion of enticing reasons fromRaz (1999). Razwrites that ‘Failure
to conformwith enticing reasons is never wrong, unreasonable, or irrational’ (Raz 1999, p. 100).
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14 In a way, this is the inverse of the suberogatory (Driver 1992) – actions that are bad but
still permissible.
15 Dancy spends time in this essay getting clear on what exactly deontic reasons – or, as he
calls them, peremptory reasons – do or do not involve. Dancy claims, for example, that conclu-
sive reasons may be enticing, not just deontic. Dancy defines a conclusive reason as ‘a consider-
ation which, though there may be others on both sides, really is the one that decides the issue in
the present case’ (Dancy 2004, p. 94). And he claims that overall reasons also may be enticing
rather than just deontic: ‘though there can be both enticing and requiring reasons, the requiring
reasons, no matter how weak, will always win in a head-to-head fight’ (Dancy 2004, p. 99).
16 For more on justifying vs requiring reasons, see Gert 2003, 2007.
17 See also Darwall (2006).
18 Thanks to Alex King for discussion on this point.
19 Stuart Hampshire (1954) argued that aesthetic objects never make obligations because
they never present pressing reasons for action – aesthetics never demands for us to act immedi-
ately. This move requires that aesthetic reasons cannot be related to practical reasons. That’s too
strong.
20 Elsewhere, Lopes (2014) draws heavily upon Judith Jarvis Thomson’s (2008) teleological
account of normativity.
21 Thanks to JulianDodd for helpful comments on this point. Rohrbaugh (2020) argues that
the demand to play the notes is simply part of some musical practices.
22 Thanks toHenry Pratt and to an anonymous referee for this journal for discussion on this
point.
23 Thanks to Derek Matravers for this example.
24 Thanks to Katie Brennan for discussion on this point.
25 This paper was presented at the Aesthetic Normativity Workshop in Padova, the CUNY
dissertation workshop, the Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 meeting in Montreal, and
at the American Society for Aesthetics Annual 2018meeting in Toronto. Thanks to audiences at
those presentations, and thanks to Robbie Kubala and Ira Newman for helpful comments.
Thanks to Elisa Calderola for her invitation to present at the normativity workshop, and for
her helpful discussion. Thanks to Anthony Cross, Saul Fisher, Alex King, SamanthaMatherne,
Dominic McIver Lopes, Per Milam, Thi Nguyen, Nick Riggle, Kate Ritchie, Giuseppe
Spolaore, and Brian Soucek for insightful comments on previous versions of this paper.
REFERENCES
Archer, A. (2016). ‘Moral Obligation, Self-Interest, and the Transitivity Problem,’ Utilitas 28,
pp. 441–464.
Archer, A. and Ware, L. (2017). ‘Aesthetic Supererogation,’ Estetika 54, pp. 102–116.
Archer, A. and Ware, L. (2018). ‘Beyond the Call of Beauty: Everyday Aesthetic Demands
under Patriarchy,’ The Monist 101, pp. 114–127.
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality through Reasoning. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Calhoun, C. (2009). ‘What Good Is Commitment?’ Ethics 119(4), pp. 613–641.
Cross A. (2017a). ‘Art Criticism as Practical Reasoning,’ British Journal of Aesthetics 57,
pp. 299–317.
Cross, A. (2017b). ‘Obligations to Artworks as Duties of Love,’ Estetika 54, pp. 85–101.
Cross, A. (Unpublished MS.). Aesthetic Obligations.
Dancy, J. (2004). ‘Enticing Reasons,’ in Wallace, Pettit, Scheffler and Smith (eds) Reason and
Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Darwall, S. (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Driver, J. (1992). ‘The Suberogatory,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70, pp. 286–295.
THERE ARE NO PURELY AESTHETIC OBLIGATIONS 19
© 2021 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Dyck, J. (2014). ‘Perfect Compliance in Musical History and Musical Ontology,’ The British
Journal of Aesthetics, 54(1), pp. 31–47.
Eaton, M. M. (2008). ‘Aesthetic Obligations,’ The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66,
pp. 1–9.
Feldman, R. (1988). ‘Epistemic Obligations,’ Philosophical Perspectives 2, pp. 235–256.
Gert, J. (2003). ‘Requiring and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength,’ Erkenntnis
59, pp. 5–36.
Gert J. (2007). ‘Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons,’ Philosophical Review 116,
pp. 533–562.
Gorodeisky, K. (Forthcoming). ‘The Centrality of Appreciation,’ in Ferrero, L. (ed) Routledge
Handbook for the Philosophy of Agency. Abingdon: Routledge.
Hampshire, S. (1954). ‘Logic andAppreciation,’ in E. Ed (ed.)Aesthetics and Language. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Hein, H. (1968). ‘Play as an Aesthetic Concept,’ The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 27,
pp. 67–71.
Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. (2010). ‘Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the
“Paradox” of Supererogation,’ Social Philosophy and Policy 27, pp. 29–63.
Kant, I. (1793/2001). ‘Critique of the Power of Judgement’. Trans Guyer and Matthews.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
King, A. (2018). ‘The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99,
pp. 632–663.
Kubala, R. (2018). ‘Grounding Aesthetic Obligations,’ British Journal of Aesthetics 58,
pp. 271–285.
Levinson, J. (2010). ‘Artistic Worth and Personal Taste,’ Journal of Aesthetics art Art Criticism,
68(3), pp. 225–233.
Little, M. (2013). ‘In Defense of Non-Deontic Reasons,’ in Bakhurst, Hooker and Little (eds)
Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Lopes, D. M. (2018). Being for Beauty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McGonigal, A. (2017). ‘Responding to Aesthetic Reasons,’ Estetika 2017, pp. 40–64.
McGonigal A. (2018). ‘Aesthetic Reasons,’ in Star (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Reasons and
Normativity. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moran, R. (2012). ‘Kant Proust, and the Appeal of Beauty,’ Critical Inquiry 38, pp. 298–329.
Nussbaum, M. (1990). Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Papineau, D. (2013). ‘There Are No Norms of Belief,’ in Chan (ed.) The Aim of Belief. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Portmore, D. (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Press, H. (1969). ‘Aesthetic Obligation,’ Journal of Philosophy 66, pp. 522–530.
Proust, M. (1992). Swann’s Way. Translated by C.K. Scott Moncrieff and T Kilmartin (eds).
New York: Vintage.
Raz, J. (1999).Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press.
Rohrbaugh, G. (2020). ‘Why Play the Notes? Indirect Aesthetic Normativity in Performance,’
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98, pp. 78–91.
Sharpe, R.A. (2000). ‘The Empiricist Theory of Artistic Value,’ The Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism, 58(4), pp. 321–332.
Tappolet, C. (2005). ‘Values, Reasons, and Oughts,’ in Reicher andMarek (eds)Experience and
Analysis. Wien: OBV & HPT.
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY20
© 2021 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Thomson, J. J. T. (2008). Normativity. London: Open Court.
Wallace, R. (2013). ‘The Deontic Structure of Morality,’ in Bakhurst, Hooker and Little (eds)
Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Weatherson, B. (2008). ‘Deontology and Descartes’ Demon,’ The Journal of Philosophy (105),
pp. 540–569.
THERE ARE NO PURELY AESTHETIC OBLIGATIONS 21
© 2021 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
